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Abstract 
The disability employment policies in Japan are characterized by the quota-levy system and aim 
to equalize the cost associated with disability employment for each firm. This paper attempts to test 
the ramifications of the information disclosure regarding each firm’s rate of disability employment 
by using data from natural experiments conducted in Tokyo and Osaka in 2003. In concrete terms, 
after the disclosure of the above information, this paper verified the difference between the 
stock-price changes observed in the two groups: the firms employing fewer disabled employees than 
legally required and those satisfying the standards set by the instrumental variable (IV) estimation. 
At the same time, we also verified whether the efficient market hypothesis holds with respect to the 
information disclosure. In addition to this, we estimated the cross-sectional relationship between the 
proportion of disabled employees and each firm’s profit in 2000, based on the information collected. 
The estimation results indicate the following: First, the penalty imposed by the Japanese disability 
employment policies—the public disclosure of the firms’ names—is not effective in promoting the 
employment of the disabled. Second, among small, medium-sized, and manufacturing firms, the 
proportion of disabled employees required by the law exceeds their optimal levels. Third, the cost of 
employing the disabled is equalized among neither the manufacturing nor the non-manufacturing 
firms. Therefore, we need a more inclusive policy assessment of the disability employment policies, 
especially with regard to the cost aspect. 
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1  Introduction 
 
  What will be necessary to promote the general employment of the persons with 
disabilities?2 This paper aims to discuss the evils caused by a quota system that 
accompanies an incomplete subsidy system (quota-levy system). In economics, persons 
with disabilities are referred to as a “specific population” and defined as those with 
physical or mental limitations that impede their daily activities or their productivity on 
the job (Haveman and Wolfe, 2000).  
Most major industrial societies implement several government programs in an 
attempt to ameliorate the consequences of work-limiting health impairments on the 
earning capacity and economic well-being of their citizens. Such government programs 
mainly consist of income-support and employment-centered programs. Among these, 
the employment-centered programs play a more central role, because realizing the 
general employment of persons with disabilities is the ultimate aim in carrying out 
social participation for them. In recent years, due to developments in medical care and 
rehabilitation technology, disabled persons using some kind of support can be as 
productive as nondisabled persons. Therefore, in order to effectively promote the 
general employment of the disabled, we need an appropriate disability employment 
policy. In each developed country, such a policy mainly consists of antidiscrimination 
laws and a quota-levy system, but neither can be called effective in promoting the 
general employment of the disabled. Furthermore, in relation to income-support 
measures, developed countries aim to determine an ideal, appropriate employment 
policy (Burkhauser and Dary, 2002; OECD, 2003; Thornton, 1998). 
  The antidiscrimination law was instituted based on the norm that the human rights of 
disabled persons should be guaranteed. This law requires employers to offer reasonable 
working conditions, such as a barrier-free workplace environment, to their disabled 
employees and outlaws discrimination against the disabled with respect to recruitment, 
payment, and dismissal. Under this law, the rights of disabled persons are guaranteed, 
and they cannot be treated differentially (Jones, 2006). Therefore, this law can secure a 
                                                  
2 The disabled are provided employment through a special welfare system for those who wish to 
start work. This is because the mainstream employment system is heavily biased against the limited 
abilities of the handicapped, and regular kind of work is difficult for them. For persons employed in 
rehabilitation institutions, social participation occurs concurrently with rehabilitation for vocational 
aid. Moreover, the labor law is not applicable to this employment system. In this paper, the term 
“general employment” is used to contrast with work obtained through the special welfare system that 
assists those who wish to find work. Therefore, general employment implies “regular” or “usual” 
employment. 
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certain quality of employment for disabled workers. However, the company is required 
to provide its disabled jobseekers and employees with reasonable facilities at its own 
expense. In other words, the antidiscrimination law does not possess a function to 
compensate the firm that bears the expense burden of employing disabled persons. 
Despite this, in countries that have adopted such a law, it is claimed that there are no 
negative repercussions associated with employing the disabled (Acemoglu and Angrist, 
2001; Burkhauser et al., 2007; Jones, 2005). 
On the other hand, the quota-levy system was initiated under the notion that 
protecting disabled persons, who are socially vulnerable, is a social duty. This system 
requires firms to employ a fixed number of disabled persons, and the government 
collects levies from firms that do not achieve the legal employment rate. These levies 
are contributed to rehabilitation foundations for promoting the general employment of 
disabled persons. In other words, the levies form the funds or source of revenue to 
provide not only the necessary rehabilitation for general employment but also the 
employment subsidies for companies who employ the disabled. Furthermore, the firms 
that achieve the legal employment rate also receive grants.  
Under this system, companies that fail to follow the above measures are penalized 
with the publication of their names, but this does not guarantee the rights of the disabled. 
Therefore, as in the pure quota system, it is quite possible that the quality of 
employment of the disabled workers is not secured (Holzer and Newmark, 1999). 
However, the quota-levy system aims to equalize the cost associated with employing the 
disabled in each firm. Therefore, this system does consider the burden borne by firms 
that employ disabled workers. In addition, preceding studies on this issue in Japan have 
pointed out that this system has been effective, and its abolition would lead to an 
increase in unemployment among the disabled, with a corresponding increase in the 
public expenditure on welfare payment (Nakajima et al., 2006). It is generally believed 
that disability employment measures should be central to all the policies regarding the 
disabled, and many countries have adopted the quota-levy system. However, this study 
aims to explain why the quota-levy system would be ineffective in promoting the 
general employment of persons with disabilities and stresses the need to determine a 
more appropriate disability employment policy.3, 4 
                                                  
3 The quota-levy system is an old system, and many countries have adopted it. However, the form of 
the system and the nature of the levies are different, depending on the cultural context of each 
country. Note that this paper only addresses the system practiced in Japan.  
4 Nakajima et al. (2006) theoretically formulated the quota-levy system in Japan, set the social 
revenue and expenditure incurred when public assistance provision is added to this system as the 
evaluation function, and attempted a simulation analysis. They pointed out that although this system 
is somewhat effective, there is a lot of room for improvement because social revenue and 
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Preceding studies have shown that the expense burdens of the employing forms 
should be reduced, in order to promote the employment of disabled persons. From this 
point of view, the quota-levy system is more desirable than the antidiscrimination laws. 
However, in order to effectively promote disability employment under this system, it is 
necessary for the expense burdens of all firms to be made equal. Since firms are 
heterogeneous, some companies can employ disabled persons with little expenditure, 
while others have to bear forbidding expenses. If such heterogeneity is not considered, 
the latter type of companies end up bearing huge financial burdens to this end—that is, 
employing sufficient disabled persons in order to achieve the legal employment rate 
becomes a very expensive proposition. At such a time, if the penal regulations 
mentioned earlier are not effective, the companies end up shirking their legal 
employment duties. If such companies increase in number, the aims of disability 
employment will remain unachieved.  
  The main purpose of this paper is to clarify whether the expense burden borne by all 
the companies is equal and the penal regulation step is effective. In other words, this 
paper evaluates the objectives of the quota-levy system, using a natural experiment in 
which the disability employment situation of individual firms was disclosed. In Japan, 
only the aggregated macro data regarding the employment of disabled persons has been 
conventionally published. However, in 2003, a private NPO released individual firms’ 
data on the disabled workers’ employment situations. In this paper, we conducted a 
virtual experiment to test “What would be the consequences if a firm achieved the legal 
employment rate.” For this, we utilized the results from this natural experiment in two 
steps. First, we confirmed the relationship between the firm’s profit and disability 
employment in 2000, when the information was collected. Second, we used the 
respective data on stock prices and checked how the information released during the 
natural experiment in 2003 impacted the true value of the firm.  
  The results indicate the following. First, we cannot deny that the imposition of penal 
regulations has been ineffective. Second, in the manufacturing industry and medium- 
and small-sized firms, the number of disabled employees required to achieve the legal 
employment rate exceed the optimum level for such companies. Third, the expense 
burden of firms employing the disabled is not equal for manufacturing and 
non-manufacturing firms. In this way, there is a pressing need for a comprehensive 
disability employment policy that provides specifications regarding the expense burden 
that accompanies disability employment. 
  This paper is structured as follows. In section 2, we have explained the Japanese 
                                                                                                                                                  
expenditure would deteriorate if this system were abolished. 
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disability employment policy and its economic problems; following this, we have 
described the information disclosure process. In section 3, we have explained the design 
of the analysis. Further on, in section 4, we have presented the estimation strategy and 
used it to check the validity of the instrumental variables. The data sources have been 
provided in section 5 and our interpretation of the estimation results is presented in 
section 6. Section 7 contains the concluding remarks. 
 
2 Background and the natural experiment 
 
2.1. The Japanese disability employment policy and its economic problems 
  The quota-levy system was enforced in the Japanese disability employment policy in 
1977. This system obliges firms to employ a quota of disabled workers at a constant rate 
of regular employees. Moreover, in the case of companies with over 301 employees that 
fail to meet the legal employment rate for disabled employees, the authorities can levy a 
fine of 50,000 yen per shortfall in disabled employment. The money collected is pooled 
into the rehabilitation foundation, and this is chiefly used to provide employment 
subsidies and grants to aid disability employment so that companies achieve the legal 
employment rate. The grants amount to 21,000 yen per excess number of disabled 
workers in firms with over 301 employees and 27,000 yen to firms with less than 300 
employees.5  When entrepreneurs are unable to furnish sufficient reasons for not 
achieving the legal employment rate, they are commanded to adopt “the disability 
employment plan” as suggested by the Ministry of Health, Labor and Welfare. 
Entrepreneurs who fail to adopt this plan are imposed a penalty payment of up to 
200,000 yen. Furthermore, for companies that continue to fall short of the required level 
of disability employment, the ultimate penal regulation measure—public announcement 
of the company’s name—is carried out.6  
This system is aimed at achieving two objectives. The first is to promote the 
employment and stability of disabled persons, while the second is to equalize and 
balance the burden borne by firms for employing persons with disabilities.7 These two 
objectives have a single, indivisible relation; they are not independent aims. They 
convey that “The employment of disabled persons, as compared to that of nondisabled 
persons, requires the firm to incur additional expenditure on plant and equipment 
                                                  
5 Both are the current figures for 2007. However, they are scarcely different from the figures for 
2000.  
6 Article 47 on the Law for the Employment Promotion, etc., of the Disabled. 
7 For the quota-levy systems adopted across the world, see Thornton (1998). 
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investment. Therefore, if an individual company bears this expense, its financial burden 
will be excessive, which will result in an imbalance. Therefore, in order to promote 
disability employment, all firms need to share the expenses.”8 
  The biggest drawback of the antidiscrimination law is that it provides no 
compensation for the expense incurred by firms that adopt disability employment. In 
this case, the precedent study shows that the disability employment objectives have not 
been achieved. The quota-levy system in Japan is concerned with the expenses borne by 
a company due to disability employment. Therefore, in order to effectively promote 
disability employment, we need to determine whether this system can provide 
appropriate compensation to companies—in other words, whether this system can 
equalize the burdens borne by all types of companies. However, the major drawback of 
this system is that the levy as well as grant amounts are set uniformly by the 
government, without acknowledging the actual heterogeneity of such burdens across 
companies. We can confirm the ill effects of this drawback from real data.  
 
(Figure 1) 
 
  Figure 1 depicts the transition of the legal employment rate and the underachievement 
company ratio dating from the foundation of the system in 2002.9 The dotted line 
shows the group of companies with over 1,000 employees, which have been unable to 
meet the disability employment target. Although this ratio has temporarily risen due to 
the increase in the legal employment rate, overall there appears to be a gradual tendency 
to decline. However, in 2002, it is still a little more than 70%. In addition, the solid line 
shows the transition of wholly private enterprises, which shows a rising trend; this 
indicates that the ratio of companies that have not achieved the legal employment rate 
has increased in recent years.  
  According to the Survey on the Actual Status of Physically Disabled 
Children/Persons (Ministry of Health, Labour and Welfare, 2003), The one for no 
                                                  
8 “The ‘levy and grant system for employing physically disabled persons’ is intended to improve the 
general level of their employment, by collecting levies from those enterprises failing to achieve the 
employment quota, and offering grants to those enterprises employing many physically disabled 
persons … Because the employment of physically disabled and mentally retarded persons imposes a 
costly financial burden, such as the expense of modifying working facilities and equipment, special 
employment management and so on, an imbalance exists between enterprises which observe their 
employment obligation and those that do not. The levy and grant system aims to adjust the 
imbalance in economic burdens and create a collective social responsibility among employers.’” 
Quoted from Thornton (1998). 
9 An underachievement company ratio is the ratio of the private companies that have not managed 
to achieve the legal employment rate to the total number of private companies. 
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employed to hope for starting work goes up to 70.2%.10 On the other hand, the ratios of 
people who are unable to find employment are about 15% for a woman in her thirties 
and 15% to 20% for senior citizens.11 This indicates that in comparison with other 
so-called minority groups in Japan, the ratio of unemployed handicapped persons with 
the ability to work is extremely high. Therefore, Figure 1 shows a continuing situation 
in which disabled persons with both the will and ability to work do not find employment. 
This is obviously not a satisfactory situation from the viewpoint of ensuring an optimum 
level of general employment of the disabled. This is because many companies refrain 
from employing workers with disabilities.  
  In the international scenario, the emission trading mechanism is similar to the 
Japanese quota-levy system. This scenario sets the upper limit for the greenhouse gas 
emissions discharged by each country, and various countries can trade in carbon rights 
for a price. By allowing this trade in carbon rights, this system aims to minimize 
reduction expense all over the world. Since the carbon rights come at a fixed price, 
countries that find reduction expenses to be excessively high can sell their carbon rights, 
while others that do not face too much reduction expenses can buy them. Therefore, 
each country can increase its gain only by reducing emission within its territory. Under 
this rule, the price determined by competitive equilibrium becomes the price of 
minimizing the total reduction expense of greenhouse gases.12 
  Now let us review the quota-levy system imposed on firms with respect to disability 
employment. The system sets the legal employment rate and obliges each company to 
employ a certain fixed number of disabled workers. The authorities collect levies from 
the companies that do not achieve the legal employment rate and distribute most of the 
revenue collected to the companies that have achieved the target level. However, since 
companies are heterogeneous in nature, some enterprises can easily employ disabled 
persons, while others cannot. In this respect, we can view this situation in light of the 
market mechanism. When the levy and grant amounts are set exogenously, it is very 
unlikely that the company burdens will be equalized. In order to promote disability 
employment throughout Japan, it is necessary to set the legal employment rate in such a 
way as to include the labor force of working-age disabled workers who have the ability 
to work, along with setting a price for a company’s right not to employ the disabled. In 
                                                  
10 This number include it for under medical treatment and the housework entering 
school and who have the occupation experience because there are some disabled who 
cannot work inherently. 
11 The data regarding senior citizens are from the “Survey of Working Conditions of Advanced 
Aged Workers” (Ministry of Health, Labour and Welfare, 2004) and those regarding women in their 
thirties are from the “Work Force Survey” (Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications, 2002). 
12 For the basic model of emission trading, see Xepapadeas (1997). 
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such a case, companies that find it overly expensive to employ disabled persons can buy 
the right not to employ a disabled person from companies that do not incur much 
expenditure over such employment. In this way, each group stands to gain by employing 
the disabled. As in the case of emission trading, under such a rule, the price determined 
by competitive equilibrium becomes the price of minimizing the cost incurred by all the 
firms in Japan, which will promote disability employment. 
 
2.2. Process of information disclosure 
  For a long time in Japan, only aggregated macro data regarding disability 
employment were available, due to which there have been rare instances of economic 
studies on the disability employment policy. However, the disability employment 
situation of individual companies in Tokyo and Osaka was publicly disclosed in 2003. 
The process of this disclosure was as follows. 
  In 1999, a private NPO and stockholder of a company named Japan Airlines 
Corporation (JAL) claimed compensation for damages from JAL and asked for the 
imposition of delinquency charges on the manager of JAL “because the manager of this 
company did not positively employ disabled persons, a large sum was paid as levy, and 
this had resulted in damage to this company”; this case was brought before the Tokyo 
District Court.13  The plaintiff insisted this enterprise was repeatedly apathetic to 
disability employment and thereafter filed a similar case against Sony. Along with some 
other NPOs interested in the disability problem, this organization further called for the 
publication of the disability employment situation of individual firms under the purview 
of each Bureau of Labor in Tokyo and Osaka. However, the above Bureaus of Labor 
had decided not to publish this information. The primary reason for this was the penal 
regulation measure of publicly announcing the defaulting company’s name under the 
disability employment policy acts as social sanctions to the defaulting enterprises. 
Therefore, the publication must include a description of the obstacles faced during the 
appropriate accomplishment and management of the disability employment policy. 
Secondly, with the corporate name and its problems made public, people might connect 
the company activities with a social evaluation of the enterprise, which would lower 
their social credit and impair honest profits.14  
                                                  
13 Regarding this case, the Tokyo District Court settled the Japan Airlines shareholder lawsuit (JAL 
suit) by causing a reconciliation between the two parties on May 17, 2001. The terms of the 
reconciliation are as follows: JAL was ordered to “change the disability employment rate from 
1.29% to 1.49%, which was the national average in 2003, and subsequently to 1.8%, which is legally 
required by 2010. Meanwhile, JAL is mandated to announce their achievement rate on their home 
page.” 
14 Extracted from the home page of “the DPI Japan meeting” (http://www.dpi-japan.org/3issues/3-6- 
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  In May 2001, the above private NPO filed a suit for disability employment 
information disclosure regarding individual companies from each labor bureau and, at 
the same time, submitted an “information disclosure query” regarding the bureaus’ 
correspondence with the government. The information disclosure examination 
committee received the statement of the query, based on the Administrative Appeal Law, 
for the Minister of Health, Labor and Welfare and prepared a report which contained an 
almost full-scale disclosure, as follows: “Regarding the list of companies that have not 
achieved the employment rate, the company names should be disclosed, with the 
exception of the disability classification. Moreover, regarding the enforcement situation 
report of the disabled persons’ employment plan, the number of disabled persons 
required to achieve the target employment, the situation of the employment, and the 
enforcement situation of the plan should be disclosed, excluding the company’s name.” 
The Minister of Health, Labour and Welfare received this report on December 9, 2001, 
and decided to implement it.15 As a result, the disability employment situation of the 
enterprises under the jurisdiction of each bureau, as of 2000, was published in Tokyo on 
October 8, 2003, and in Osaka on September 8, 2003. The disclosed company 
characteristic was different in each bureau. In Tokyo the companies who had not 
achieved the legal employment rate was published and in Osaka the companies whose 
employees is 1,000 or more regardless of the achievement of the legal employment rate 
was published. The private NPOs that obtained the disclosure of this information 
published it on their own home page. In Japan, there were very few cases of such 
information disclosure concerning the employment of the disabled before this 
experiment, and this was just the first step leading to a much more large-scale 
disclosure.16 Since this event occurred accidentally in the beginning, it can be regarded 
as a natural experiment. 
 
 
3  The design of the analysis 
 
  In this paper, by using the natural experiment in 2003 and estimating the impact of 
the information disclosure on the stock prices, we explored what would happen in a 
                                                                                                                                                  
-koyou/0110_0305tokyo.htm) 
15 Extracted from the contents of the report regarding the partial disclosure of the job situation of 
handicapped persons 
16 From 1977 to 2003, the names of only four companies had been announced, but even these 
announcements were not part of the penal regulations step. Moreover, they were all small businesses. 
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virtual scenario wherein each enterprise had managed to achieve the legal employment 
rate. Our evaluation was based on information collected in 2000. If the rational 
expectations and efficient market hypotheses hold, the public information, except that 
regarding the disability employment situation, would be reflected in the stock prices.  
  What would be the effect of this kind of information disclosure on stock prices? In 
order to determine this, we should enumerate some factors affecting stock price changes. 
The first factor is the investor’s evaluation of the company’s corporate social 
responsibility. By 2003 in Japan, socially responsible investments were made in 
companies that tended to practice corporate social responsibility. If investors consider 
disability employment to be part of a company’s social responsibility, the stock prices of 
companies that do not achieve the legal employment rate may fall.17 This point has 
been clarified by Nagae (2005), who applied the event study methodology to the Osaka 
samples and tested the short-term changes in stock prices resulting from the information 
disclosure. The results indicated that while the stock prices of firms that achieved the 
legal employment rate fell, those of the defaulters rose. Moreover, these differences 
were statistically significant. Based on this, Nagae has pointed out the possibility that 
the penal regulations measure of publishing the defaulting company’s name is not 
effective. In addition, the above scenario suggests that investors may not evaluate a 
company on the basis of its corporate social responsibility.  
  The second factor concerns the expense burden borne by the company in order to 
comply with disability employment. Whether the firm fulfills its obligatory legal rate of 
disability employment depends on its manager’s opinion of the firm’s employment 
obligation and what he or she thinks of the penal regulation measure of publicly 
announcing the company’s name. As was already noted, under the quota-levy system in 
Japan, it is very likely that the company burdens will be unequal. Therefore, companies 
that incur excessive expenses for employing disabled persons tend not to achieve the 
legal employment rate and instead pay the levy. However, if an abovementioned type of 
company considers disability employment to be its duty, then the expense burden on 
such a company will be regarded as impeding profit maximization. Conversely, a 
company that does not need much expenditure to employ disabled persons can easily 
achieve the legal employment rate and avail of grants. As in the former case, if the latter 
types of companies are unable to achieve the legal employment rate, they are regarded 
as failing to perform profit maximization. This situation should influence the 
decision-making of the investor. 
                                                  
17 In America, the equity value of firms charged with violating equal employment opportunity laws 
falls whenever a suit, decision, or settlement is announced (Hersch, 1991). 
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  The third factor has to do with awareness regarding social discrimination against 
disabled persons. If society is convinced that persons with disabilities have low 
productivity, the stock prices of enterprises employing a significant number of disabled 
persons might fall.  
  In this paper, we have focused on the second and third possibilities. First, I divided 
the sample companies into two groups—those who achieved the legal employment rate 
and those who failed to achieve it. Then, I estimated the change in normal stock prices 
before the information disclosure and thereafter inspected the differences in the stock 
prices changes for both the groups after the information disclosure. At this stage, it is 
necessary to note an endogeneity problem. Since the company attribute is heterogeneous, 
different companies incur different expenditures for employing disabled persons. If such 
expenditure influences corporate performance, whether or not the legal employment rate 
is achieved, the investor decision will have endogeneity due to the variable of corporate 
performance. Therefore, we need instrumental variables such as the scale of 
employment in the past, which is highly likely to affect the disability employment but 
not likely to influence the decision-making of the investor. Following this, in order to 
determine whether the firms with each attribute are performing profit maximization and 
in order to confirm the validity of the instrumental variables, I investigated the 
relationship between each firm’s level of disability employment and profit in 2000, for 
which the disclosure information was collected.  
  Next, in order to confirm whether or not the third factor has any influence on the 
above, I analyzed the long-term excess returns of the information disclosure. Since 
stock prices are influenced by various factors, the possibility of a short-term change 
would be anomalous (Gompers et al., 2003). Therefore, it is necessary to confirm 
whether the efficient market hypothesis holds true. If society is convinced that disabled 
workers have low productivity, information disclosure would lead to a short-term fall in 
the stock prices of firms that employ a significant number of the disabled. However, 
such firms are sure to show positive long-term excess returns, despite the negative 
short-term stock price reaction18. In this paper, by performing a long-term analysis, I 
have confirmed that there would be no such anomaly as described above.  
  The investor foresees the future earnings of the enterprise and decides his or her 
present stock trading. There is no anomaly, and when the endogeneity and heterogeneity 
of each firm are controlled, the difference in stock price changes after the information 
                                                  
18 This trial has already been performed in the context of sexism. Wolfers (2006) referred to the 
discrimination awareness that exists in society as “mistake-based discrimination” and analyzed 
whether this discrimination awareness is reflected in stock prices data. 
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disclosure indicates “what will happen if a company achieves the legal employment 
rate.”  
 
 
4   The impact of the disability employment information: 
Endogeneity and estimation strategy 
 
4.1. Estimation strategy 
  In this section, I have explained the estimation strategy used to inspect the impact of 
the information disclosure in 2003 on the stock prices. To begin with, we will assume 
that the rational expectation hypothesis holds. Then, we will use the following 
estimation models to analyze the reaction of the stock prices to the information 
disclosure. 
 
 ijiii RER εββ +++= βX10                        (1) 
 
  Here, ER expresses the short-term cumulative abnormal returns and long-term 
abnormal returns that are subsequently defined. R is the dummy variable that indicates 
whether the firm has achieved the legal employment rate—this takes the value of 1 if 
the firm achieves the legal employment level and 0 if it does not. ε  is the error term, 
and X represents the control variable matrix, which is unrelated to the information 
disclosure but nevertheless affects the stock price changes.  
  1β  indicates the impact on stock prices: it shows the difference of this impact 
between the average (cumulative) abnormal return of the underachieving companies and 
the average (cumulative) abnormal return of the achieving companies. Hence, this 
parameter becomes the index indicating what would happen if a company achieved the 
legal employment rate. Using this formulation, we can eliminate the macro shock 
experienced by the entire sample and measure the pure effect of the event.  
  Following this, let us consider the influence of corporate performance. The variable 
indicating whether or not the firm benefits by achieving the legal employment rate has 
endogeneity because this allows us to consider two possibilities based on which the 
information disclosure may influence the stock prices. The first possibility indicates a 
direct influence of information disclosure regarding the disability employment situation 
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on stock prices. According to the second possibility, corporate performance is seen in 
the light of some company attributes that strongly relate to the employment of the 
disabled, and any impact on the corporate performance is reflected in the stock prices. 
When R has endogeneity, if we estimate (1) using ordinary least squares (OLS), 1β  
does not satisfy the consistency. Therefore, we need to employ the two stage least 
squares (TSLS) estimates. In the first step, we use X and the instrumental variable Z 
that influences disability employment but not the investors’ decision-making; these 
variables are assumed to be independent, and OLS generates the following estimation 
models.  
 
iiii uR +++= 21 αXαZ0α                            (2) 
 
In order to control the influence of the scale of each equity in the stock market and 
any industry-related event that is unrelated to the information disclosure, we can use the 
industrial dummy variables and the market capitalization toward the end of June 2003 
for the short-term control variables and the industrial dummy variables and the mean 
value of the market capitalization from June 2003 to June 2004 for the long-term 
control variables. In addition, the long-term dependent variable, which will be explained 
in the following section, does not consider the individual stock attributes of the 
information disclosure at that point in time. Therefore, I have used the profit rate 
(ordinary profit ÷ total assets) of 2003 for a long-term control variable. In the following 
subsection, we will define the dependent variables. 
 
4.2. The definition of excess return 
 
4.2.1. Short-term excess return and cumulative abnormal return 
  In the short-term analysis, we have used the cumulative abnormal return derived 
using event study methodology as a dependent variable.19 The event study, pioneered 
by Fama et al. (1969), measures the rate of change in stock prices due to the occurrence 
of an event as compared to the expected rate of change had the event not taken place. It 
is a technique of testing the impact of the event by analyzing the deviation. There is no 
established methodology for this technique, but normally, many researchers use a 
two-step estimation method, which can be explained as follows.20  
                                                  
19 This methodology is frequently used in corporate policy decision-making (Kothari et 
al., 2007). 
20 This explanation is based on that provided by Mackinlay (1997) and Campbell et al. 
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  First, we define the event in which we are interested. This is to specify the time when 
the investors obtain information regarding the event. In general, the investor does not 
necessarily know about the event’s occurrence on the very day of its occurrence; even if 
the investor is rational, it takes some time for the information to spread. In this case, the 
event day should be extended by several days to the day on which the stock prices show 
the influence of the event. The period after which it is predicted that the event will 
influence the stock prices is called an event period (event window; 2L ).
21 
 
(Figure 2) 
 
  After defining the event, we estimate what would be the stock market earning rate 
during the event period if the event had not occurred. For this, it is necessary to decide 
which estimation model should be used. The most widely used estimation model is the 
market model, which examines the trends in the rates of normal returns before and after 
a particular event, excluding any shock that would affect the portfolio in the overall 
stock market. The market model uses the overall risk in a market portfolio (the rate of 
return of the Tokyo Stock Price Index [TOPIX] in this article) as a criterion for 
calculating the expected rate of return from individual shocks. Let τiR  be firm i’s daily 
return on day t, and τmR  be the market’s daily return on day t. After regressing τiR  
on τmR , the market model value can be obtained as follows. 
 
τττ ε imiii RbaR ++=                                                 (3) 
 
  After defining the model, we measure the abnormal movement of the stock prices due 
to the event’s occurrence. First, the period during which the stock prices are not affected 
by the event is called the estimation period ( 1L ). This estimation period is used to 
estimate model (3) for a company. At this stage, it is assumed that investors trade stocks 
immediately after they acquire new information. Therefore, the daily individual stock 
price changes are assumed to occur independently of each other. The estimated value 
obtained from this analysis helps explain the normal stock prices change of each equity.  
  Next, the abnormal movement of stock prices due to the event is measured by using 
the estimated value obtained above. The abnormal movement of stock prices is defined 
as the difference between the price earning ratio forecast from the estimation period and 
                                                                                                                                                  
(1997). 
21 If we want to inspect whether the influence of the event is sustained, consider the last part of the 
event to be denoted by ( 3L ).  
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the price earning ratio in the event period, which can be obtained as follows. 
 
)ˆˆ( τττ βα miiii RRER +−=                                             (4) 
 
  Here, τiER shows the excess return of firm i ’s stock price on τ  business days, 
where iαˆ  and iβˆ  are estimators of iα  and iβ , respectively. Now, as shown in 
Figure 2, time is assumed to be τ ; the first day of the estimate period is assumed to be 
0T ; its last day, 1T ; and the last day of the event period is assumed to be 2T . Therefore, 
the estimate period and the event period are 011 TTL −=  and 122 TTL −= , respectively. 
Under null hypothesis, 0H , the event has no impact on the mean or variance of returns, 
and the abnormal returns follow the normal distribution with mean 0 and the following 
variance. 
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  It is necessary to obtain the excess return index for the entire event period in order to 
determine its influence on stock prices. The value of the excess returns on each day of 
the event period accumulated over the entire period is used for the index. This index is 
called the cumulative abnormal return (CAR). Assuming 2211 TT ≤≤< ττ , the 
accumulated value of excess returns between 1τ  and 2τ , or CAR, is obtained as 
follows. 
 
∑
=
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ττ
τττ ii ERCAR                                             (6) 
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The estimate value of the variance of the CAR is derived by adding (5) to the event 
period. 
 
Setting the estimation and the event period 
  Some drawbacks of the event study method have been pointed out. First, the 
investors’ expectations from the information on the event may not be the same (Card 
and Krueger, 1997).22 That is, the investors might have different expectations regarding 
the manner in which disability employment influences corporate performance based on 
the corporate attributes. Second, it is difficult to capture the timing of the event. If the 
information regarding the said event is already well known, the investors’ expectations 
will already be reflected in the stock prices. In this case, it becomes impossible to 
identify whether the detected influence is due to the event or not.  
  In this paper, I dealt with the above problem as follows. First, I divided the sample 
into groups according to the employee scale, industry, and regional attributes, and by 
using the window after the event ( 3L ), I checked whether the information impact on 
stock prices had continued.23 By doing so, I was able to verify whether the investors 
have equal expectations from each group. Second, the event day is set as September 22, 
2003 for Osaka and October 22, 2003 for Tokyo, which were the dates on which the 
indicated corporate names were published on the homepages of the “Shareholder 
ombudsman” and “DPI Japan conference,” respectively. 24  Then, I selected six 
estimation periods—30, 60, 90, 120, 240, and 247 days and five event periods—1, 3, 5, 
11, and 21 days. These are standard periods in accordance with the previous studies that 
have used event study methodology. From the results obtained from this variety of 
estimation and event periods, I selected the most typical periods. Thereafter, considering 
that the investors reacted to the information disclosure, I identified the respective 
estimation and event periods during which this typical pattern was shown.25 Based on 
the above procedure, we can arrive at the short-term dependent variable, CAR, from the 
event period of 11 days and estimation period of 240 days.  
 
                                                  
22 Card and Krueger (1997) analyzed the impact of the revision of the Minimum Wages Act on stock 
prices after a newspaper article containing this information was published (event). However, they 
could not obtain the conformal interpretation to detect a possible impact. They pointed out that this 
was because the investors had different expectations from the company with respect to the stock 
prices, even though raising the minimum wages influenced the company’s profit. 
23 I selected 11days window from day +1 to day +11 from the event. 
24 I performed the analysis by assuming the days on which the information was disclosed by the 
Osaka and Tokyo labor bureaus as the event days. However, I was unable to obtain a unified 
interpretation of these two events. 
25 If needed, I can include details regarding this analysis. 
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4.2.2. Long-term dependent variable 
  For the long-term analysis, I evaluated the buy-and-hold abnormal return (BHAR). 
Let τiR  be firm i’s daily return on day t and τmR  be the market portfolio’s daily 
return on day t. Then, BHAR can be determined as follows.26 
 
∏ ∏
= =
+−+=
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)1()1( ττ                    (7) 
 
  We selected two periods during which the short-term impact of the event was thought 
to have disappeared—from 30 days to one year after the event and from 30 days to two 
years after the event.  
 
4.2.3. The relationship between short-term and long-term excess returns 
  I would like to confirm the relationship between the short-term and long-term excess 
returns mentioned above. Figure 3 shows the excess return transition in the form of a 
solid line arrow. On the day of the event ( S ), the information reaches the public. At this 
time, there are three kinds of possibilities with respect to the transition of a short-term 
excess return from 0T  to 1T —it will either rise or fall or remain constant. Let us first 
consider the first two possibilities. After the rise (or fall) of the short-term excess return, 
if there is no long-term influence of the information, the transition of the long-term 
excess return becomes constant (i.e., the efficient market hypothesis holds (E1)、(E2)). 
In the event of an anomaly, the transition of the excess return should rise (fall) in the 
short-term and then fall (rise) in the long-term, which is depicted by using the dotted 
lines (mistake-based discrimination (M)). 
 
(Figure 3) 
 
 
4.3. Validity of the instrumental variable 
 
4.3.1. Selection of the instrumental variable 
 In order to determine whether achieving the legal employment rate is good or bad for 
a company, we need to see if its attributes and human resource management have a 
strong influence on the company. These factors strongly correlate with R for the 
estimation models (1) and (2). However, these are predetermined variables that have 
                                                  
26 The proxy variable of the market portfolio is the Topix (Tokyo Stock Price Index). 
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been decided before the information disclosure and therefore cannot be regarded as 
determinant factors of the stock price change. Therefore, they become candidates of the 
instrumental variables Z .  
  The candidates of the instrumental variables are, to begin with, the number of 
employees. The quota-levy system is a type of quota system, and the firm is expected to 
employ a fixed percentage of disabled persons. However, it is very rarely the case that 
the legal employment rate corresponds with the optimum number of disabled employees 
for a firm. Since the quota-levy system in Japan is designed in such a way that the 
burden rates differ depending on the employee scale, whether it is beneficial or not for a 
company to achieve the legal employment rate will also strongly depend on its 
employee scale.27  
  Second, the time of the company’s establishment influences its disability employment 
compliance. Since the issue of specific populations attracts considerable social interest, 
it is very likely that the employment of disabled persons in a private firm is strongly 
influenced by social trends. For instance, when the quota-levy system began in Japan, 
the newspapers constantly focused and criticized the banking industry’s non-compliance 
with the legal employment rate requirement, although it was believed to be difficult to 
achieve the legal employment rate of 1.5% at that time.28, 29 In addition, the big 
enterprises that successively achieved the legal employment rate in the first half of the 
1980s made news30. These things suggest that corporate activity directed toward 
disability employment is strongly influenced by social trends. The prevalent social 
norms during the establishment years of old enterprises included support for disability 
employment, which would have worked out for the companies. Moreover, such 
                                                  
27 The levy duty is imposed on companies with over 301 employees. However, the quota duty is 
imposed on companies with more than 56 employees.  
28 For example, in the editorial titled “Acceptance of handicapped persons in companies” published 
in Mainichi Shimbun, a famous daily newspaper in Japan, on October 31, 1977, and well as another 
article in the “Economist” (Mainichi Shimbun) dated November 1, 1977, the quota-levy system is 
introduced in such a tone as to suggest that it is the company’s duty to employ the disabled. 
29 We can regard this criticism as applicable to the entire regulation industry of this country. Under 
such a system, it was expected that achieving the legal employment rate would be difficult. 
Documents from the time of the system’s establishment indicate that a governmental body was 
proposed that could take the lead in achieving the required rate of employment, along with obtaining 
civilians’ consent (Tezuka, 1999).  
30 For example, the famous Japanese daily Asahi Shimbun published an article on March 30, 1981, 
which highly praised Fujitsu’s achievement of the legal employment rate and its positive step of 
offering incentives for employing the handicapped. Another Japanese daily, the Yomiuri Shimbun, 
carried an article on June 5, 1981, regarding Nissan’s achievement of the handicapped persons’ 
employment rate of 1.5%—a first for the automobile industry. The Asahi Shimbun on June 11, 1981, 
reported Fuji Bank’s achievement of a handicapped persons’ employment rate of 1.53%, when the 
legal employment rate for financial institutions was only 1.5%, and so on. 
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companies would also have adequate know-how regarding the employment of the 
disabled.  
  Third, the human resource management of the firm influences its employment 
patterns. With many of the big Japanese companies, rapid aging is a concern. Among 
the full-time workers working in big companies, that is, companies with more than 
1,000 employees, the percentage of employees who are 45 years old or older has rapidly 
risen from 31% in 1990 to 36% in 1998 (Genta, 2001). Since it is common knowledge 
that most of the disabled employees in a private enterprise are partially disabled persons 
who suffered a handicap during the period of employment itself, we use the average 
yearly income and average age as variables to represent the human resource 
management of the company (Tezuka, 1999).  
  When the rational expectations and efficient market hypotheses hold, past public 
information does not influence stock prices. Therefore, the values of the 
above-mentioned instrumental variables are expressed in terms of their logarithms and 
are entirely based on the data collected from individual companies in 2000, which was 
the year of the information disclosure. 
 
4.3.2. The confirmation of the disability employment in 2000 and its relation to 
the company economic profit 
  In this subsection, we will inspect the relation between the employment of the 
disabled and company profit at the time of data collection pertaining to the disclosure. 
The reasons for this are as follows: One, we need not use the instrumental variable 
method if the employment of disabled persons is unrelated to corporate performances; 
therefore, it is important to confirm the validity of using the TSLS. Two, by clarifying 
the relation between disability employment and corporate performance, we can estimate 
whether the firm is achieving profit maximization. 
  In this paper, I have employed an estimation model to evaluate the short-term 
implications of the employer discrimination hypothesis propounded by Becker (1972); 
this estimation model, which was developed by Hellerstein et al. (2002), is called the 
“market test.” This model confirms that the employee attribute ratio and company profit 
are not correlated if a company manages to perform profit maximization. In this paper, 
in line with Sano (2005) and Kawaguchi (2007), who verified the employer sex 
discrimination hypothesis by using the market test in Japan, I used the following 
estimation model. 
 
- 20 - 
ii
iiiii
industryd
laboragefirmageDebtcapital
L
Dprofit
εβ
ββββββ
++
+++++=
_
__
6
543210   (8) 
 
  The dependent variable iprofit  is a proxy variable for profitability, defined as 
operating income/total sales, which is essentially the price-cost margin. The operating 
income does not correspond to economic profit without subtracting the opportunity cost 
of capital. The discrepancy between the operating income and economic profit depends 
on each firm’s amount of capital. To deal with this issue, I included a fixed assets/total 
sales ratio, denoted as capital  in the regression. The variable LD  is the proportion 
of disabled employees among the total employees. Debt ratio ( Debt ) is used to control 
the impact of the debt on the profit during a negative shock in the market. The variable 
firmage _  indicates the firm’s age. Since older firms tend to hold obsolete capital, 
their assets/total sales ratio may not reflect the real value of the capital efficiency, and 
since older firms may also hold a significant amount of intangible capital, such as 
advanced research and development know-how or an established brand name, it is 
important to control for this variable. The variable industryd _  represents industry 
dummies. Moreover, the average employee age is used to control a peculiar attribute of 
the firm. The OLS is used as the estimation method, and I have assumed the 
heterogeneity of the error term using a method explained by White (1980). 
 
4.3.3. Data, descriptive statistics, and the estimation result 
Data and descriptive statistics 
  The home page of the Shareholder ombudsman announced the names of 290 
enterprises with 1,000 or more employees (hereafter, referred to as “big firms”) that the 
Osaka Bureau of Labor had made public. The home page of the DPI Japan conference 
printed the names of 9,012 enterprises that had not achieved the legal employment rate 
made public by the Tokyo Bureau of Labor. Among them, I have selected this study’s 
samples from the firms that were listed on the first section of the Tokyo Stock Exchange 
and regarding which there was sufficient data for estimation. Other data used in this 
study include the information for the year 2000 collected from “Corporate Financial 
databank” compiled by the Nikkei Economic Electronic Databank System (NEEDS). 
  According to the Survey on the Actual Employment Status of Persons with Physical 
Disabilities and Persons with Intellectual Disabilities (Ministry of Health, Labour and 
Welfare, 2003), the distribution of disability employment is as follows: While 71.1% of 
the disabled workers are employed in the non-manufacturing industries, 28.9% are 
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employed in manufacturing. This uneven distribution indicates that the corporate burden 
resulting from the employment of disabled persons is greatly different for both types of 
industries. Therefore, the following analysis is divided on the basis of employee scale, 
district, and type of industry. Tables 1-1 and 1-2 contain descriptive statistics. 
 
(Table1-1, Table1-2) 
 
Estimation results 
  Table 2 shows the estimation results of estimation model (8). Since the names of only 
the big firms were released to the public in Osaka, the results are divided into those for 
firms with less than 999 employees (hereafter referred to as small- and medium-sized 
firms) and those for the big firms in Tokyo. Note that in Tokyo, only the names of the 
enterprises that had not achieved the legal employment rate were made public. In table 2, 
columns (1), (2), and (3) show results pertaining to the manufacturing firms, while 
columns (4), (5), and (6) show results pertaining to the non-manufacturing firms. 
Among these, columns (1) and (4) pertain to the small- and medium-sized firms in 
Tokyo, columns (2) and (5) show data regarding the big firms in Tokyo, and columns 
(3) and (6) pertain to the firms in Osaka. Moreover, the results of the enterprises that 
achieved and of those that did not achieve the legal employment rate in Osaka are 
depicted in columns (7) and (8), respectively. 
  In columns (7) and (8), both groups show negative effects, but these are not 
significant. The results in columns (3) and (6) are similar. Though it is possible that the 
detection power is relatively poor due to the meager number of samples from Osaka, the 
data suggest that both the legal rate achieving and underachieving enterprises are 
maximizing their profits. If this estimation is correct, it may not be possible to detect the 
information disclosure’s influence on stock prices.  
  As noted above from the Tokyo samples, it is evident that underachievement of the 
legal employment rate with respect to disability employment does not influence the 
profit of the big manufacturing firms. Therefore, we can say that this group performs 
profit maximization by not achieving the legal employment rate. However, for the 
small- and medium-sized manufacturing and the non-manufacturing enterprises in 
Tokyo, since there is a positive effect in the case of big firms and a negative effect in the 
case of small and medium-sized firms, it appears that the cost of disability employment 
differs depending on the employee scale. Moreover, the above results indicate that the 
optimum number of disabled employees is likely to be different for manufacturing and 
non-manufacturing businesses.  
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  Based on the analysis in this section, we can confirm that the employment of the 
disabled relates to firm profit for some groups.31 Although the corporate earnings, 
which investors regard as an index for trading equities, are not always same, there is a 
high possibility that they are linked to company profits. Therefore, it is necessary to 
perform an instrumental variable estimation. Moreover, though the data described in this 
section can neither be used to remove the fixed effects nor make the causal relation 
specific, the lack of correlation between profit and disability employment suggests the 
possibility that each group in Osaka has managed to perform profit maximization. In 
addition, there is a likelihood that the burden cost increases when the legal employment 
rate is achieved, because the ratio of disabled employees does not correlate with profit 
for the underachieving big manufacturing enterprises in Tokyo. However, in the small 
and medium-sized manufacturing and the non-manufacturing enterprises in Tokyo, 
underachievement of the legal employment rate shows the possibility that they are not 
doing profit maximization. 
 
(Table 2) 
 
5  Data and descriptive statistics 
 
  In the following section, I will explain the data used to estimate the impact of 
information disclosure and provide descriptive statistics regarding my analysis. In 
addition to the samples mentioned in subsection 4.3., I have used data regarding those 
firms in Tokyo that achieved the legal employment rate. These are the enterprises 
having their headquarters in Tokyo, where their annual financial statements were 
submitted, and the names of which were not published in the home page of the DPI 
Japan conference.32 Table 3 lists the selected enterprises according to the type of 
industry and employee scale. From this table, we can see that with respect to the 
distribution of industries, the ratio of non-manufacturing firms that have managed to 
achieve the legal employment rate has increased. This is because non-manufacturing 
firms include industries in which it is easier to employ disabled persons, for example, 
                                                  
31 When we check the correlation of the variables pertaining to the ordinary income and the 
proportion of disabled employees, we find significant positive relations in the big businesses of 
Tokyo and significant negative relations in the Osaka companies that have achieved the legal 
employment rate. Therefore, the correlation is robust, indicating that in some groups, disability 
employment is correlated to the firm performance.  
32 According to Japan’s quota-levy system rules, for companies having main offices in both Tokyo 
and Osaka, the main office is assumed to be in the district where it has been registered.  
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service, wholesale, and retail industries. Therefore, the samples used in this context are 
not greatly different across the whole of Japan.33 
 
(Table 3) 
 
  Stock prices and market capitalization data were obtained from “Nikkei Needs 
Financial Quest,” while financial data was obtained from “Corporate Financial 
databank” and the “Quarterly Corporate Report.”  
 
(Table 4-1, Table 4-2) 
 
Tables 4-1 and 4-2 contain descriptive statistics regarding the manufacturing and 
non-manufacturing firms, respectively. The respective values of CAR, two years BHAR, 
and the variance estimate of CAR have been presented in the tables. 
 
6  Estimation results 
 
6.1. The short-term results 
  In this subsection, I will discuss the short-term results. In the event study 
methodology, the estimated variance value at the estimation period is used to 
statistically verify whether or not the value of CAR is 0. This information is required for 
the regression analysis using CAR. Therefore, in order to formulate the estimation 
model (1) wherein the short-term CAR is set to be a dependent variable, I have 
performed an estimation in which CAR is equal to the standard deviation during the 
estimation period (Mckenzie and McAleer, 1998).  
 
(Table 5-1, Table 5-2) 
 
  Tables 5-1 and 5-2 show the results for manufacturing and non-manufacturing 
businesses obtained by assuming the short-term CAR to be a dependent variable. 
Columns (1) and (2) show the estimation results for the big firms in Tokyo, columns (3) 
and (4) show those for the small- and medium-sized firms in Tokyo, and columns (5) 
and (6) show the results for the big firms in Osaka. Moreover, columns (1), (3), and (5) 
show the results of the weighted least square (WLS) estimates that control the corporate 
                                                  
33 See section 4.3.3. 
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scale in the stock market as well as industry, while columns (2), (4), and (6) show the 
results of the TSLS estimates, which take into consideration factors that may influence 
the achievement of the legal employment rate.  
  In both the tables, we have reported the findings of the following tests: (i) the 
Durbin-Wu-Hausman test, which tests whether the legal employment rate achievement 
in relation to the stock price reaction is really a endogenous variable, (ii) the 
over-identifying restrictions test, which tests whether all the instrumental variables have 
any correlation with the error term, and (iii) the first-stage F-test, which tests whether 
the instrumental variables affect the endogenous variable.34 In this paper, I concluded 
that the instrumental variable was valid, since all these tests cleared it.35  
  First, I would like to describe the results of the manufacturing firms. In each table, I 
have presented the marginal effects of the probit estimation results and their 
significance with respect to estimation model (2) in order to examine the influence of 
corporate attributes on the likelihood of endogeneity bias. While columns (1), (3), and 
(5) show the results of only the instrumental variables, columns (2), (4), and (6) show 
the results after adding the control variables. In the small- and medium-sized enterprises 
in Tokyo, firms with few employees tend to achieve the legal employment rate. 
Regarding the big firms in Tokyo, since the coefficient of the average annual salary is 
significantly negative, it is evident that the firms that achieve the legal employment rate 
are offering lower wages. In contrast, in Osaka, firms with substantial numbers of 
                                                  
34 The over-identifying restrictions test is usually called Sargan’s test. However, in the long-term 
analysis, I have used the Hansen J test, since I have used White’s method (1980) for dealing with 
heterogeneity. Regarding the similarities between both the tests, see Hayashi (2000).  
35 The validity of the instrumental variable that cleared these tests is high; however, there is a 
possibility of weak instruments—when the correlation between the instrumental variables and the 
endogenous variable is low, the reliability of the TSLS estimator becomes lower (Staigner and Stock, 
1997). Therefore, I have performed limited information maximum likelihood (LIML) estimation for 
the group wherein the instrumental variables were valid, along with the conditional likelihood ratio 
test (Andrews et al., 2006; Moreira, 2003). As a result, in the short-term estimation for the 
large-scale manufacturing industries in Tokyo, the coefficient is –0.1706 and the p-value is 0.0214, 
while in the long-term estimation (Tokyo), the coefficient is –0.2933 and the p-value is 0.4807. 
However, with respect to the short-term estimation for small-scale manufacturing industries in 
Tokyo, the coefficient is –0.0575 and the p-value becomes 0.1776. Therefore, I have estimated only 
the employee scales showing a stable relation with the endogenous variable as the instrumental 
variable; the coefficient shows –0.2144 and the p-value becomes 0.000. In this way, I have obtained 
the same results in this paper. In this instance the first-stage F value is 31.00. Based on the Stock and 
Yogo (2005) test, the critical value when the TSLS bias of the confidence interval is less than 10% is 
16.38. In this way, I have confirmed that the instrumental variable has a high enough reliability. 
From the above, I ascertained that the presence of weak instruments would not hamper this 
estimation. However, we should be cautious while supposing the validity of the four instrumental 
variables regarding the medium- and small-scale businesses in Tokyo, as described in this paper. For 
the instrumental variable methodology and the problem of weak instruments and their measurement, 
in particular, see Murray (2006). 
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employees are achieving the legal employment rate. Further, the significant positive 
effect relating to the operational years indicates that the big enterprises that have long 
addressed the issue of disability employment are achieving the legal employment rate.  
  Following this, we will check the influence of the stock prices. The instrumental 
variables are valid only for Tokyo, not for Osaka. Therefore, judging from columns (2) 
and (4) for Tokyo and column (5) for Osaka, all groups show a significant negative 
effect.  
  Next, I would like to describe the results for the non-manufacturing firms. In the 
small- and medium-sized firms in Tokyo, the employees are few in number, while their 
average age is high. Moreover, a new firm at its establishment tends to achieve the legal 
employment rate. Since the average age is high, this group possibly contains several 
partially disabled employees. However, the attributes of such firms are the least 
influential among those of the other groups. 
  Now let is check the influence of the stock prices. Among these groups, since the 
instrumental variables are invalid, I have used the results of the WLS estimates that 
control the industry as well as the corporate scale in the stock market. For the small- and 
medium-sized firms in Tokyo, there is a significant negative effect; however, for the big 
firms in Tokyo, there is a significant positive effect, while for Osaka, there is no effect.  
 
6.2. The long-term results 
  In this section, I wish to confirm the long-term results. Table 6 shows the estimation 
results for the manufacturing and non-manufacturing firms that were obtained using the 
two-year BHAR as the dependent variable.36 Columns (1), (3), and (5) show the results 
of the OLS estimation that assumes heterogeneity in the error term and controls the 
industry and the corporate scale in the stock market. Columns (2), (4), and (6) show the 
result of the TSLS estimate that takes into consideration the factor that influences 
whether the achievement of the legal employment rate is beneficial for the firm.37  
 
(Table 6) 
 
  Since our data is limited to the large-scale manufacturing firms in Tokyo, the 
instrumental variables are valid, and the other groups are judged on the basis of the OLS 
estimation results. The table shows that information disclosure regarding the disability 
                                                  
36 The results for long-term impact after one year were similar to that after two years. 
37 For the OLS estimation, I assumed heterogeneity and dealt with the error using a method 
suggested by White (1980). 
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employment situation does not influence a firm’s equity value in the long run. Column 
(3) shows that in the large-scale manufacturing firms in Tokyo, achieving the legal 
employment rate tends to have a high influence on the firm’s long-term equity value; 
however, the influence is lost when we consider the endogeneity bias (see column (4)).  
In the next section, let us see the disclosure impact on the rate of profit. The rates of 
profit for both groups are significantly negative, which shows a negative short-term 
impact. However, the large-scale non-manufacturing firms in Tokyo also show a 
significant negative influence with respect to the profit rate. No such influence is shown 
in the case of Osaka.  
 
6.3. Summary and interpretation 
  In this section, we will collect all the obtained results. First, let us review the 
short-term results. In the manufacturing sector, there are significant negative differences 
between the stock prices of firms that do not employ the legally required number of 
disabled employees and the stock prices of firms that employ the legally required 
number of disabled employees. A similar difference was detected as regards the small 
and medium-sized non-manufacturing enterprises in Tokyo. However, in the large-scale 
non-manufacturing enterprises in Tokyo, there is a significant positive difference 
between the above two types of firms.  
  A long-term influence is not seen in any group. The data reveal that the efficient 
market hypothesis holds; further, there does not appear to be any mistake-based 
discrimination based on the belief that disabled persons have low productivity. 
Therefore, the short-term results pertaining to the disability employment situation 
reflect the true value of the firm. The rate of profit shows a significant negative effect in 
the groups showing a significant negative short-term impact on the stock prices. This is 
because long-term stock returns are strongly influenced by the rate of profit; this shows 
that stock returns are strongly influenced by profit maximization behavior—a result that 
is consistent with the short-term estimation results. However, the large-scale 
non-manufacturing firms in Tokyo show a significant negative influence, which is 
inconsistent with the short-term estimation results. From the results presented in section 
4.3., this group is not found to have any debt; therefore, investors may temporarily 
judge this group’s rate of profit as negative.  
  With respect to the short-term changes, in both the manufacturing and 
non-manufacturing enterprises, the stock prices of the firms that had not achieved the 
legal employment rate rose, while the stock prices of the firms that had achieved the rate 
fell. This indicates that the penal regulation measure mandated in the Law for 
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Employment Promotion, etc., of the Disabled, of publicly announcing the 
underachieving company’s name, is ineffective—in fact, the disclosure of such 
information through this measure might raise the stock prices (Nagae, 2005). This 
conclusion by Nagae was confirmed in this paper.  
  A negative impact was detected in the manufacturing sector; in this type of business, 
if a firm employs more disabled persons than is legally required, the firm incurs 
considerable expenditure. This is consistent with the estimation results in section 4.3., 
which suggest that if the firm does not achieve the legal employment rate, its profit 
negatively or does not correlate with the proportion of disabled employees; in other 
words, the firm already incurs the cost or performs profit maximization.  
Although this provision is now being abolished in phases, the disability employment 
measures had once contained exclusion rate regulations that reduced the legal 
employment rate for those businesses that could not easily employ disabled persons. 
Since many of the manufacturing businesses have to conform to such regulations, it is 
clear that employing disabled persons would involve higher cost for manufacturing 
businesses as compared to that for non-manufacturing businesses. When the attributes 
of firms include a small number of employees and low wages, disabled persons can be 
employed at a lower cost. This strongly influences the stock price reactions, indicating 
whether the legal employment rate achievement is good or bad for the firm. This 
interpretation is also justified by the presence of an excessive bias in the estimated value. 
In this case, why was the significance level regarding the impact on stock prices low in 
Osaka? With regard to the attributes of the firms that achieved the legal employment 
rate in Osaka, the employee scale was large and the firms had been operating for many 
years. It has been pointed out that such firms possess sufficient know-how concerning 
the employment of the disabled; moreover, the economies of scale apply to these firms. 
In section 4.3., the coefficient of this group is not significant but negative. The lack of 
significance may be due to the fact that the fixed effect of the abovementioned group of 
firms cannot be controlled.  
  Although a negative effect was detected for the small- and medium-sized 
non-manufacturing firms in Tokyo, a positive effect was detected for the large-scale 
non-manufacturing firms in Tokyo. The detection power is low due to the meager 
number of samples from Osaka; however, the coefficient value is negative, and these 
results are also consistent with the estimation results in section 4.3. 
  The positive effect that is detected in the big enterprises of Tokyo is possibly because 
the optimum number of disabled employees in this type of business exceeds the legal 
employment rate. It is thought that the investors understood the information of the 
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underachievement of the legal employment rate as signaling that the optimum number 
of disabled employees was not achieved; that is, the firm had failed to perform profit 
maximization. As noted above, a substantial number of persons with disabilities are 
employed in the non-manufacturing business. Many regulation industries are included 
in this type of business; in the banking industry, in particular, there is a lot of scope for 
employing the disabled—which has already been pointed out through the social 
criticism mentioned above. Moreover, many such businesses, although they may be 
privatized at present, were formerly managed by the government. Since the legal 
employment rate in government organizations is higher than that in private enterprises, 
government-managed companies that have been privatized already employ many 
disabled persons. Such companies do not incur the initial fixed costs needed for 
employing persons with disabilities, and they are sure to have sufficient know-how 
regarding disability employment. Thus, if investors already know of smoothly 
functioning regulated industries and formerly government-managed companies that 
employ substantial numbers of disabled workers, they tend to believe that profit 
maximization involves employing the optimum number of disabled employees in excess 
of the legal employment rate. The rate of profit exerts a negative influence on the excess 
return of long-term stock prices. This suggests that the element of the investors’ trust in 
these enterprises should be included as another factor that influences stock price change. 
 
 
7  Conclusion and Remarks 
 
 This paper has revealed some relation between the proportion of disabled employees 
and the firms’ rate of profit in the year 2000, in which the disclosure information was 
collected; this finding is based on data pertaining to the natural experiments that 
occurred at Tokyo and Osaka in 2003, when the information regarding each firm’s 
disability employment situation was disclosed. Following this, we conducted a virtual 
experiment to determine what would happen if enterprises achieved the legal 
employment rate, using the natural experiment’s sample of disclosed companies to 
estimate the influence of information disclosure on their stock prices. The estimation 
results are summarized as follows. First, there is no significant difference between the 
above two groups of firms in terms of disability employment with regard to the excess 
return of long-term stock prices after the information disclosure. Second, among the 
small- and medium-sized firms and the manufacturing firms, there is a significant 
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negative difference between those two groups of firms with regard to the excess return 
of short-term stock prices after the disclosure. Third, among the large-scale 
non-manufacturing firms in Tokyo, there is significant positive difference between the 
two groups of firms with regard to the excess return of short-term stock prices after the 
event. Fourth, these results are consistent with the cross-sectional relationship between 
the proportion of the disabled employed and the profit for each firm in 2000, when the 
information was collected. 
  The main objectives of the quota-levy system, which seeks to support the disability 
employment measures in Japan, are to promote disability employment and equalize the 
company burden accompanying disability employment. The estimation results in this 
paper suggest the following: First, it is clear that the penal regulations measure is not 
effective; second, the manufacturing industry and medium- and small-sized businesses 
face a prohibitive expense burden for disability employment and therefore fail to 
achieve the legal employment rate; third, the disability employment rate achievement 
burdens are not equal between the manufacturing and non-manufacturing industries.  
  In Japan, the problems faced by handicapped persons have increased with the 
adoption of the Law for Supporting the Independence of Persons with Disabilities, 
which aims at fostering self-reliance in disabled persons rather than giving them 
protection. However, in order to ensure that disabled persons lead an independent life, 
the authorities need to promote the general employment of persons with disabilities. For 
this reason, it is necessary to amend the present quota-levy system in Japan. As I 
suggested in section 2, one economically viable solution would be to set a price on the 
right not to employ disabled persons.38 However, before introducing such a mechanism, 
we need to specify the economic cost of disability employment to the firm, in concrete 
terms, including that for the old large-scale firms that have operated for several years 
and the non-manufacturing enterprises, etc., which have additional know-how regarding 
disability employment. In consequence, there is a pressing need for an overall policy 
assessment of the quota-levy system, including the measures adopted to promote the 
employment of the disabled.39  
  The persisting problem in this paper is how to control the fixed effect by using the 
panel data and confirm the results mentioned in subsection 4.3. Moreover, the BHAR 
                                                  
38  However, there is no consensus regarding the realistic validity of such a mechanism in 
economics.  
39 This report is consistent the analysis by Nakajima et al. (2006). It is not the purpose of this paper 
to argue for a desirable policy, an executable remedy, or an immediate increase in the grant; however, 
in accordance with Nakajima et al. (2006), this paper seeks to encourage innovation in this field. 
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used in the long-term analysis has not completely captured the stock market risk.40 
Since the necessary data will have to be gathered over the following years, more time is 
needed to check the robustness of this paper’s results, after which we will be able to 
analyze the equity market risk more thoroughly using the long-term data. 
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Figure1. Change in the ratio of companies that did not achieve the legal 
employment rate from 1977 to 2002.  
 
Note: The legal employment rate was increased in the years 1988 and 1998. Therefore, the legal 
employment rate underachievement corporate ratio has temporarily increased in those years.  
Source: Current state of employment of physically handicapped and mentally deficient persons, 
The Ministry of Health, Labour and Welfare 
 
 
 
Figure2. Concept chart of the event study method 
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Figure3. Concept chart of the route of expected excess return after 
information disclosure 
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Table1-1. Descriptive statistics to analyze the relationship between the firm 
profit and the rate of employment of disabled employees in manufacturing 
firms 
 
 
Note: “Tokyo small and medium” indicates the group of firms in Tokyo with a scale of less than 
999 employees. “Tokyo large” indicates the group of firms in Tokyo with a scale of over 1,000 
employees, and “Osaka” indicates the group of firms in Osaka with a scale of over 1,000 employees. 
 
 
Variables Observations Mean 
Standard 
deviation 
Minimum Maximum
Operating income/sales (%)     
Tokyo small and medium 86 0.0544 0.0708 –0.109 0.3577
Tokyo large 190 0.0443 0.0533 –0.1062 0.3107
Osaka 76 0.0611 0.0778 –0.0056 0.4715
Proportion of disability 
employment 
     
 Tokyo small and medium 86 0.01 0.0041 0 0.0165
Tokyo Large 190 0.0129 0.0026 0.003 0.0179
Osaka 76 0.0164 0.0037 0.0081 0.0272
Fixed assets/total sales      
Tokyo small and medium 86 0.2024 0.1582 0.029 0.9464
Tokyo large 190 0.1511 0.0783 0.0218 0.4564
Osaka 76 0.1621 0.1075 0.004 0.5402
Debt/total sales      
Tokyo small and medium 86 0.6791 0.3533 0.147 1.603
Tokyo large 190 0.7079 0.3224 0.2066 1.8366
Osaka 76 0.6578 0.3389 0.1307 1.9864
Age of the firm      
Tokyo small and medium 86 62.5 15.417 30 101
Tokyo large 190 64.895 16.926 10 123
Osaka 76 69.987 20.673 3 116
Average age of employees     
Tokyo small and medium 86 38.926 3.111 30.9 46.7
Tokyo large 190 39.155 2.509 30.1 44.2
Osaka 76 38.907 2.619 29.8 44.5
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Table1-2. Descriptive statistics used to analyze the relationship between 
firm profit and the rate of the disabled employees in non-manufacturing 
firms 
 
Variables Observations Mean 
Standard 
deviation 
Minimum Maximum
Operating income/sales (%)     
Tokyo small and medium 104 0.0663 0.0628 –0.0551 0.2939
Tokyo large 144 0.0688 0.0816 –0.0404 0.5183
Osaka 41 0.0512 0.0476 –0.0064 0.1698
Proportion of disability 
employment 
     
 Tokyo small and medium 104 0.0072 0.0052 0 0.0166
Tokyo large 144 0.0122 0.0029 0.0028 0.0173
Osaka 41 0.0167 0.004 0.0088 0.0254
Fixed assets/total sales      
Tokyo small and medium 104 0.1532 0.1796 0.0054 1.2355
Tokyo Large 144 0.137 0.1414 0.0121 0.9039
Osaka 41 0.131 0.1305 0.006 0.6577
Debt/total sales      
Tokyo small and medium 104 3.8017 30.1967 0.08 308.624
Tokyo large 144 1.1509 2.1983 0.1333 21.138
Osaka 41 0.871 0.9515 0.1998 4.188
Age of the firm      
Tokyo small and medium 104 48.462 20.815 15 108
Tokyo large 144 54.069 23.29 13 135
Osaka 41 57.366 23.28 17 107
Average age of employees     
Tokyo small and medium 104 35.563 4.297 25.6 44.6
Tokyo large 144 37.241 4.305 25.4 49.6
Osaka 41 36.556 3.955 28.1 45.5
 
Note: “Tokyo small and medium” indicates the group of firms in Tokyo with less than 999 
employees. “Tokyo large” indicates the group of firms in Tokyo with over 1,000 employees, and 
“Osaka” indicates the group of firms in Osaka with over 1,000 employees. 
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Table2. The relation between firm profit and the rate of disabled employees 
 Manufacturing Non-manufacturing Osaka 
Variables 
Tokyo small and 
medium 
Tokyo large   Osaka 
Tokyo small 
and medium 
Tokyo large   Osaka Achieved 
Not 
achieved 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Proportion of disability –3.1478* 0.9566 –3.4877 –2.6309** 4.7936** –2.5005 –1.3607 –2.3049 
 (1.7447) (1.3465) (2.1016) (1.2575) (2.2370) (1.8376) (1.8345) (2.8395) 
Fixed assets/total sales –0.0870 0.0733 0.1664 0.0327 0.0356 0.0703 –0.0059 0.1579 
 (0.0551) (0.0706) (0.1115) (0.0608) (0.0739) (0.1019) (0.0951) (0.1011) 
Debt/total sales –0.0824*** –0.0477*** –0.0294 0.0004 –0.0079 0.0207* 0.0344*** –0.0024 
 (0.0247) (0.0138) (0.0228) 0.0002** (0.0059) (0.0103) (0.0093) (0.0186) 
Age of the firm age –0.0003 –0.0002 0.00001 –0.0004 –0.0009*** –0.0001 –0.00001 0.0004 
 (0.0004) (0.0002) (0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0003) (0.0005) 
Average age of employees –0.0101*** –0.0032** –0.0083* –0.0050** –0.0026 –0.0011 –0.0017 –0.0087** 
 (0.0036) (0.0013) (0.0045) (0.0022) (0.0017) (0.0012) (0.0025) (0.0040) 
Legal employment rate   0.0120   0.0073   
Achievement dummy   (0.0150)   (0.0123)   
Constant 0.5891*** 0.1720*** 0.4288** 0.2590*** 0.1622** 0.1395** 0.1131 0.3608** 
 (0.1535) (0.0552) (0.1962) (0.0739) (0.0731) (0.0676) (0.0875) (0.1403) 
Number of observations 86 190 76 104 144 41 49 68 
R-squared 0.4434 0.3937 0.4716 0.3850  0.4311 0.7726 0.6955 0.4894 
Note: Standard errors are in parentheses under the regression coefficients. OLS standard errors are robust standard errors. ***, **, and * denote 
significance at 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively, for the two-sided test. The industry dummies are included in all the estimation models. “Tokyo small and 
medium” indicates the group of firms in Tokyo with less than 999 employees. “Tokyo large” indicates the group of firms in Tokyo with over 1,000 
employees, and “Osaka” indicates the group of firms in Osaka with over 1,000 employees.  
 
- 38 - 
Table3. Industries to which the sample firms belong (firms listed in the first section of the Tokyo Stock Exchange) 
Manufacturing Non-manufacturing 
 Tokyo Osaka  Tokyo Osaka 
Industry 
Not 
achieved 
Achieved
Not 
achieved
Achieved Industry 
Not 
achieved
Achieved
Not 
achieved
Achieved 
Foods 19(6) 10 (7) 4 4 Fishery, Agriculture, & Forestry 3(1) 0 0 0 
Nonferrous Metals 12(0) 1(3) 0 1 Mining 2(1) 0(2) 0 0 
Rubber Products 0(0) 2(1) 1 0 Construction 41(7) 10(7) 4 7 
Other Products 12(3) 3(7) 4 1 Electric Power & Gas 1(0) 1 0 2 
Pulp and Paper 5(0) 1(3) 2 0 Transportation & Warehouses 10(5) 8(10) 1 4 
Pharmaceuticals 15(4) 1(1) 4 5 Information & Communication 26(13) 10(6) 3 0 
Chemicals 28(20) 9(7) 7 6 Wholesale Trade 18(36) 5(21) 5 2 
Oil & Coal Products 2(3) 1(1) 0 0 Retail Trade 16(14) 9(8) 8 2 
Transport Equipment 9(0) 8(0) 4 1 Banks & Insurance 13(8) 14(12) 2 1 
Machinery 18(15) 5(9) 5 4 Real Estate 5(13) 1(10) 0 0 
Textile & Apparels 7(8) 1(6) 6 3 Services 13(10) 5(8) 1 1 
Metal Products 4(4) 2(6) 0 0 All non-manufacturing 153(108) 63(84) 24 19 
Glass & Ceramic Products 6(3) 1(2) 0 0 Total 345(195) 129(158) 69 51 
Precision Instruments 8(5) 2(2) 1 0      
Iron & Steel 5(1) 2(8) 2 1      
Electric Appliances 42(15) 17(11) 5 6      
All manufacturing 192(87) 66(74) 45 32      
Note: The sample firms with an employee scale of less than 999 employees are in parentheses. All the firms in Osaka employed more than 1,000 people.
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Table4-1. Descriptive statistics of the variables used to analyze the impact 
of the disability employment information disclosure (manufacturing) 
Groups Variables Observations Mean 
Standard 
deviation 
Minimum Maximum
To
ky
o 
sm
al
l a
nd
 m
ed
iu
m
 
CAR 161 0.0025 0.0706 –0.2190 0.2382 
Variance estimate 161 0.0010 0.0012 0.0001 0.0132 
LEA dummy 161 0.4596 0.4999 0.0000 1.0000 
Market capitalization1 161 23.6623 0.9266 21.7974 27.0797 
Number of employees 161 6.0277 0.9346 1.7918 6.9027 
Average yearly income 161 6.3189 0.1912 5.7881 6.9575 
Average employee age 161 3.6617 0.0862 3.4308 3.9240 
Age of the firm 161 4.0887 0.2979 3.2189 4.7536 
BHAR 156 0.3637 0.6731 –0.7394 2.7310 
Market capitalization2 156 23.7918 0.9039 21.8942 27.2458 
Profit rate in 2003 156 0.0213 0.1337 –1.5417 0.1668 
To
ky
o 
la
rg
e 
CAR 258 0.0234 0.0904 –0.5885 0.3700 
Variance estimate 258 0.0006 0.0006 0.0001 0.0054 
LEA dummy 258 0.2558 0.4372 0.0000 1.0000 
Market capitalization1 258 25.3150 1.3703 22.6648 29.2777 
Number of employees 258 7.9960 0.8679 6.9088 10.9944 
Average yearly income 258 6.4136 0.1762 5.7696 6.9256 
Average employee age 258 3.6633 0.0718 3.4045 3.8816 
Age of the firm 258 4.1148 0.3105 2.1972 4.8040 
BHAR 246 0.1152 0.5490 –0.9504 2.8994 
Market capitalization2 246 25.4697 1.3475 22.8639 29.3056 
Profit rate in 2003 246 0.0324 0.0412 –0.0970 0.2566 
O
sa
ka
 
CAR 77 –0.0514 0.0927 –0.3253 0.2820 
Variance estimate 77 0.0007 0.0007 0.0001 0.0058 
LEA dummy 77 0.4156 0.4961 0.0000 1.0000 
Market capitalization1 77 25.4879 1.3023 23.1198 29.0021 
Number of employees 77 7.9869 0.8507 6.9157 10.8188 
Average yearly income 77 6.4212 0.1970 5.8761 6.8855 
Average employee age 77 3.6595 0.0690 3.3945 3.7955 
Age of the firm 77 4.1607 0.4964 0.6931 4.7449 
BHAR 73 0.1922 0.4431 –0.6824 1.6820 
Market capitalization2 73 25.6370 1.2884 23.2902 29.0419 
Profit rate in 2003 73 0.0451 0.0411 –0.0111 0.1828 
 
Note: LEA indicates the legal employment rate achievement. With the exception of CAR, variance 
estimate, LEA dummy, and BHAR, I used the log-values of all the remaining variables. Moreover, I 
carried out BHAR after processing the abnormal value. Here, abnormal value refers to the data that 
deviated more than four times the standard deviation from the mean. Market capitalization1 indicates 
the market capitalization at the end of June 2003, while market capitalization2 shows the mean of 
market capitalization from the end of June 2003 to June 2004. The unit for the average yearly 
income, market capitalization1, and market capitalization2 is 1,000,000 yen. 
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Table4-2. Descriptive statistics of the variables used to analyze the impact 
of the disability employment information disclosure (non-manufacturing) 
Groups Variables Observations Mean 
Standard 
deviation 
Minimum Maximum
To
ky
o 
sm
al
l a
nd
 m
ed
iu
m
 
CAR 192 –0.0058 0.0866 –0.3315 0.4758 
Variance estimate 192 0.0009 0.0008 0.0001 0.0068 
LEA dummy 192 0.4375 0.4974 0.0000 1.0000 
Market capitalization1 192 23.9091 1.2562 21.6858 28.7283 
Number of employees 192 5.7930 0.8505 1.6094 6.8987 
Average yearly income 192 6.3454 0.3865 3.2426 8.4968 
Average employee age 192 3.5810 0.1252 3.2426 3.8133 
Age of the firm 192 3.6969 0.6688 0.0000 4.7791 
BHAR 184 0.3516 0.7337 –1.2235 2.9699 
Market capitalization2 184 24.0949 1.2309 22.0895 28.7577 
Profit rate in 2003 184 0.0458 0.0544 –0.0870 0.2574 
To
ky
o 
la
rg
e 
CAR 216 –0.0120 0.0725 –0.2995 0.2781 
Variance estimate 216 0.0010 0.0039 0.0001 0.0571 
LEA dummy 216 0.2917 0.4556 0.0000 1.0000 
Market capitalization1 216 25.0370 1.4924 22.3733 30.1996 
Number of employees 216 7.9191 0.7996 6.9088 11.5138 
Average yearly income 216 6.4274 0.3528 3.4563 7.2910 
Average employee age 216 3.6088 0.1121 3.2347 3.9040 
Age of the firm 216 3.8529 0.5482 0.0000 4.8978 
BHAR 197 0.2631 0.6214 –0.8863 2.9695 
Market capitalization2 197 25.2634 1.5001 22.3215 30.0660 
Profit rate in 2003 197 0.0398 0.0477 –0.0482 0.2677 
O
sa
ka
 
CAR 43 –0.0087 0.0986 –0.3938 0.3230 
Variance estimate 43 0.0007 0.0008 0.0001 0.0035 
LEA dummy 43 0.4419 0.5025 0.0000 1.0000 
Market capitalization1 43 24.9691 1.3147 23.0090 28.2317 
Number of employees 43 8.0753 0.9485 6.9246 10.4779 
Average yearly income 43 6.3708 0.2741 5.6958 6.9363 
Average employee age 43 3.5946 0.1087 3.3358 3.8177 
Age of the firm 43 3.9721 0.4475 2.7726 4.6634 
BHAR 41 0.1864 0.4712 –0.6252 1.4885 
Market capitalization2 41 25.09383 1.317445 23.15778 28.25647
Profit rate in 2003 41 0.0312 0.0287 –0.0153 0.1296 
 
Note: LEA indicates the legal employment rate achievement. With the exception of CAR, variance 
estimate, LEA dummy, and BHAR, I used the log-values of all the remaining variables and carried 
out BHAR after processing the abnormal value. Here, abnormal value refers to the data that deviated 
more than four times the standard deviation from the mean. Market capitalization1 indicates the 
market capitalization at the end of June 2003, while market capitalization2 shows the mean market 
capitalization between June 2003 and June 2004. The unit for the average yearly income, market 
capitalization1, and market capitalization2 is 1,000,000 yen. 
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Table5-1. Estimation results for the short-term analysis (manufacturing) 
Dependent variable CAR Tokyo small and medium Tokyo large Osaka 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Independent variables WLS TSLS WLS TSLS WLS TSLS 
LEA dummy –0.0259 –0.2081*** 0.0033 –0.3271*** –0.0628* –0.0176 
  (0.0172) (0.0516) (0.0160) (0.1250) (0.0370) (0.0619)
Market Cap.1 0.0238**  0.0235** 0.0061 0.0165* –0.0090 –0.0177 
 (0.0094) (0.0118) (0.0052) (0.0092) (0.0153) (0.0173)
DWH    26.9871***   19.5945***   0.7906 
Sargan statistic Yes   Yes   Yes 
First-stage f  7.61***  2.60**  6.92*** 
First-stage probit estimates marginal effect 
Dependent variable R             
Full-time employees –0.2008*** –0.2008*** 0.0272 –0.1161** 0.4068*** 0.3782**
  (0.0606) (0.0607) (0.0334) (0.0528) (0.1495) (0.1815)
Average yearly income 0.3426 0.3424 –0.3484* –0.6045*** 1.5841* 1.4469 
  (0.2800) (0.2896) (0.2006) (0.2099) (0.7356) (0.8826)
Average employee age 0.7491 0.7500 –0.2638 0.2981 –0.0779 0.1074 
  (0.7042) (0.7627) (0.4157) (0.4373) (1.3315) (1.4904)
Age of the firm –0.0445 –0.0446 0.0273 –0.0250 0.8144** 0.8204**
  (0.1762) (0.1763) (0.0904) (0.0932) (0.3462) (0.3491)
Market Cap.1  0.0002  0.1275***  0.0036 
     (0.0550)   (0.0036)   (0.1298)
Pseudo R-squared 0.1687 0.1687 0.0746 0.1173 0.4754 0.4761 
Log-likelihood value –92.3307 –92.3307 –135.763 –129.497 –27.4231 –27.3850
Number of observations 161 161  258 258 77 77 
 
Note: Standard errors are in parentheses under the regression coefficients. ***, **, and * denote 
significance at 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively, for the two-sided test. Regarding the first-stage f, the 
coefficient of all instrumental variables shows the value of the null hypothesis of 0 with estimation 
model (2). DWH indicates the Durbin-Wu-Hauseman test, and the Sargan statistic shows the results 
of the over-identifying restrictions test. LEA indicates the legal employment rate achievement, and 
Market Cap.1 indicates market capitalization1.The independent variables used in the probit 
estimation are expressed in their logarithmic form. For the coping with the weak Instruments, see 
footnote 35. 
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Table5-2. Estimation results for the short-term analysis 
(non-manufacturing) 
Dependent variable CAR Tokyo small and medium Tokyo large Osaka 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Independent variables WLS TSLS WLS TSLS WLS TSLS 
LEA dummy –0.0252* –0.0334 0.0346* 0.2605*** –0.0454 –0.2045 
  (0.0140) (0.0346) (0.0178) (0.1055) (0.0764) (0.1914)
Market Cap.1 0.0056 0.0061 –0.0064 –0.0211 –0.0137 0.0085 
 (0.0061) (0.0063) (0.0061) (0.0104) (0.0313) (0.0301)
DWH    0.0657   8.5899***   0.9068 
Sargan statistic No   No   Yes 
First-stage f  8.18***  2.56**  1.28 
First-stage probit estimates marginal effect 
Dependent variable R             
Full-time employees –0.1931*** –0.1887*** 0.0445 0.0215 0.0494 –0.1573 
  (0.0575) (0.0581) (0.0410) (0.0513) (0.1023) (0.2086)
Average yearly income 0.0153 –0.0211 –0.0143 –0.0473 0.4809 0.4510 
  (0.1142) (0.1219) (0.1219) (0.1252) (0.4747) (0.5486)
Average employee age 0.9023* 0.9493** 0.3310 0.3478 –0.2951 0.1429 
  (0.4769) (0.4807) (0.4103) (0.4097) (1.1718) (1.3265)
Age of the firm –0.2017** –0.1938* –0.1139 –0.1057 0.0439 0.0490 
  (0.0998) (0.1001) (0.0751) (0.0751) (0.2492) (0.2642)
Market Cap.1  0.0424  0.0231  0.1911 
     (0.0399)   (0.0312)   (0.1513)
Pseudo R-squared  –113.8083 –121.2543  –22.8834
Log-likelihood value  0.1351  0.07  0.2247 
Number of observations 192 192 216 216 43 43 
 
Note: Standard errors are in parentheses under the regression coefficients. ***, **, and * denote 
significance at 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively, for the two-sided test. Regarding the first-stage f, the 
coefficient of all instrumental variables shows the value of the null hypothesis of 0 with estimation 
model (2). DWH indicates the Durbin-Wu-Hauseman test, and the Sargan statistic shows the results 
of the over-identifying restrictions test. LEA indicates the legal employment rate achievement, and 
Market Cap.1 indicates market capitalization1.The independent variables used in the probit 
estimation are expressed using their logarithmic values. For the coping with the weak Instruments, 
see footnote 35. 
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Table 6. Estimation results for the long-term analysis 
    Tokyo small and medium Tokyo large Osaka 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Manufacturing 
LEA dummy 0.1299 0.1192 0.2424*** –0.1104 0.1172 0.5087 
  (0.1143) (0.3039) (0.0882) (0.3315) (0.1260) (0.3424)
Profit rate in 2003 –0.3373* –0.3404* –1.2117* –1.1833* –0.4783 0.7273 
  (0.2013) (0.2040) (0.6956) (0.7051) (1.7677) (2.1188)
DWH      0.017   3.952**    1.909 
Hansen J statistic Yes   Yes   Yes 
First-stage f   3.81***   3.47***   4.71***
Number of observations 156 156 246 246 73 73 
Non-manufacturing 
LEA dummy –0.1133 0.2354  0.0387 1.9888 –0.1798 –1.0431
  (0.1055) (0.3600) (0.0923) (1.9466) (0.1770) (0.8216)
Profit rate in 2003 –3.0677*** –2.8296*** –1.5717** –2.9181 –2.7866 –2.8992
  (1.0602) (1.0165) (0.7486) (2.2538) (3.7328) (3.8856)
DWH      0.1300   5.293**   2.137 
Hansen J statistic Yes   Yes   Yes 
First-stage f   6.22***   0.32   0.39 
Number of observations 184 184 197 197 41 41 
 
Note: Standard errors are in parentheses under the regression coefficients. ***, **, and * denote 
significance at 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively, for the two-sided test. Regarding the first-stage f, the 
coefficient of all instrumental variables shows the value of the null hypothesis of 0 with estimation 
model (3). DWH indicates the Durbin-Wu-Hauseman test, and the Hansen J statistic shows the 
over-identifying restrictions test results. LEA indicates the legal employment rate achievement. For 
the coping with the weak Instruments, see footnote 35. 
 
 
 
 
